The time-course of representing others' perspectives is inconclusive across the currently available models of ToM processing. We report two visual-world studies investigating how knowledge about a character's basic preferences (e.g. Tom's favourite colour is pink) and higher-order desires (his wish to keep this preference secret) compete to influence online expectations about subsequent behaviour. Participants' eye movements around a visual scene were tracked while they listened to auditory narratives. While clear differences in anticipatory visual biases emerged between conditions in Experiment 1, post-hoc analyses testing the strength of the relevant biases suggested a discrepancy in the time-course of predicting appropriate referents within the different contexts. Specifically, predictions to the target emerged very early when there was no conflict between the character's basic preferences and higher-order desires, but appeared to be relatively delayed when comprehenders were provided with conflicting information about that character's desire to keep a secret. However, a second experiment demonstrated that this apparent 'cognitive cost' in inferring behaviour based on higher-order desires was in fact driven by low-level features between the context sentence and visual scene. Taken together, these results suggest that healthy adults are able to make complex higher-order ToM inferences without the need to call on costly cognitive processes. Results are discussed relative to previous accounts of ToM and language processing.
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Introduction
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a commonly used term to describe the ability to understand and predict events in terms of other peoples' mental states, such as their intentions, beliefs and desires. As such, it is not just an everyday task, but an every-time-we-encounter-another-person task. So it is something that as adults we perform frequently and, with the well-documented exceptions of disorders such as autism and schizophrenia (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2000; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) , seemingly also without a great deal of difficulty. However, a long tradition of research suggests that ToM reasoning incurs a certain degree of difficulty. Research on children's development of ToM abilities strongly suggests that children only develop fully functioning ToM abilities, sufficient to pass false-belief tasks, for instance, in their fourth or fifth year (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) . Research with adults also suggests that, at least on certain tasks or in certain domains, ToM inferences are not automatic (e. 
